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Abstract 
This paper proposes a model with two preys of facultative mutualist type and one predator. Linear 
predation functions are considered and preys are only considered to be harvested. The stability of the 
model is analyzed theoretically and numerically in this paper. The optimal harvest policy is studied and 
the solution is derived in the interior equilibrium case using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Finally, 
some numerical simulations are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Mutualism is an interaction in which species help one another. Janzen (1985) has argued that most of 
the mutualisms can be classified into one of the four classes: seed-dispersal mutualism, pollination 
mutualisms, digestive mutualisms, and protective mutualisms. In this paper we are interested to discuss 
the protective mutualisms of fish species. This type of mutualisms may be facultative mutualism or 
obligate mutualism. In facultative mutualism the interaction between the species is helpful but not 
essential but in obligate mutualism neither mutualist can survive without the other. Many fish species 
form protective mutualisms. A particularly well-known example involves tropical anemone fishes, or 
clown fishes, and their anemones. Clown fishes are immune to stinging nematocysts of giant sea 
anemones and will and nest amongst their tentacles. Horse mackerels appear to have a similar 
relationship with Portuguese man-of war jellyfish. 
In recent past many works on mutualism have done (Lengeler et al., 1999; Wallin, 1923, 1927; 
Margulis, 1970, 1981). Those are not harvesting models. Simultaneously, some extraordinary 
harvesting models are studied by Clark (1985, 1990) and some other ecologists and scientists 
(Mesteron-Gibbons, 1998; Kot, 2001; Kar & Chaudhuri, 2004; Strobele & Wacker, 1995; Dai & Tang, 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/asir             Applied Science and Innovative Research                  Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017 
2 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
1998) also studied the management and behaviour dynamic harvesting models. Mark Kot (2001) 
discussed a two species protective mutualism model. In which there are two species with population 
sizes 1N  and 2N , and each species grows logistically in the absence of other. The model is  
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where 12  and 21  are the measures of the strength of positive effect of species 2 on the species 1 
and of species 1 on species 2. This model is for facultative mutualism so far 2121 ,,, kkrr  are all 
positive. That is each species can, in other words, survive without its mutualist. The species may 
surpass their carrying capacity or may undergo unlimited growth what has been called “an orgy of 
mutual benefaction” (May, 1981) depending upon the values of the strength of one species on another. 
The equations (1) and (2) may be used for obligate mutualism if we take 2121
,,, kkrr
 all negative. 
In this case neither species can survive on its own; each species is banking on the other to save it. The 
facultative models are generally more stable than obligate models. We state the definition of facultative 
or co-operative models. 
Definition 1.1: The system 
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In this paper, we study the problem of harvesting two facultative species in the presence of a predator 
species which feeds on both the facultative prey species. The predator species is not harvested. The 
problem is clearly stated in the section 2. We have examined the equilibrium of the system and the 
conditions of their existence in section 3. The local stability of the steady state solutions is examined in 
section 4. We derive an optimal harvesting policy in section 5. Numerical examples are discussed in 
section6. The paper ends with a brief conclusion in section 7.  
 
2. Formulation of the Model 
The governing equations of our model are, 
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where 21 , NN  are population sizes of the prey species and 3N  the population size of the predator 
at any time t. Here, )0(),0( 21  rr  are intrinsic growth rate of the first two species. Since we are 
not making a case study in respect of a specific prey-predator community, we have opted logistic 
growth rate. The parameters )0(),0( 21  KK  are carrying capacities of first two species; 21 , aa , 
both positive, are predation rates on which the third species feeds on the first two species respectively; 
21 , EE  are the harvesting efforts given on the first two species, the third species is not harvested; 
21, qq (both positive) are catchability co-efficients of 21
,NN
 respectively. The catch rate functions 
111 NEq  and 222 NEq  are based on CPUE (catch per unit effort) hypothesis. The parameters 
)0(),0( 21    are known as conversion factors and d is the mortality rate of predator species. Here 
12 measures the strength of the positive effect of the species 2N  on the species 1N  and 21  
measures the strength of the positive effect of the species 1N  on the species 2N . Considering the 
definition (1.1) we see that in absence of predator 
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Thus our model is co-operative. We hypothetically consider that the predator does not disturb the 
facultative mutualism of prey species. 
 
3. The Equilibria of the Model and the Existence Conditions 
The biological equilibria or the steady state solutions are obtained by solving 0
.
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.
iN (i=1,2,3) are time derivatives of iN (i=1,2,3) respectively. Solving these equations 
we get the points 6543210 ,,,,,, PPPPPPP  of equilibrium. The co-ordinates of these points and 
corresponding conditions of existence are given bellow. 
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111 Eqr  > 0 , 222 Eqr  > 0 and 12112  .                (10) 
The other equilibrium point is interior equilibrium and is ),,(
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4. Local Stability Analysis 
To analyze the local stability at the different equilibria we consider the following community matrix 
and use variational principle. 
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whose eigenvalues are 111
1
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 that is if the harvesting efforts are more than the corresponding biotechnical 
productivity of the two facultative prey species. We also see that if the system be stabilized at origin 
then no other equilibrium of the system will be found. 
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Now, when 2P  exists, 0)( 222  Eqr . Thus the above eigenvalues are negative i.e., the equilibrium at 
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5. Optimal Harvesting Policy 
Once the process of harvesting the resources is started, the problem of management of the fisheries can 
be viewed in terms of rent maximization. Now we shall use Pontryagin’s maximum principle to solve 
our optimization problem and obtain optimal harvest policies )(,)( 21 tEtE  such that our objective 
functional is maximized. Importance of discount rate cannot be underestimated in addressing 
environmental and resources issues. In fact the optimal stock size for a given fishery will vary 
depending on discount rate. Now we assume that  
1p Constant price per unit of biomass of 1N species, 
2p Constant price per unit of biomass of 2N species, 
21 ,cc are constant costs of fishing for the two facultative prey species per unit effort. 
Our objective is to study the optimal harvest policy, i.e., ],0[)(
max
ii EtE  , i=1, 2 and   ,0t  
to maximize the profits of harvesting agencies and to keep the populations at an optimum level. The 
objective functional representing the present value J of a continuous time stream of revenue is given by 


 
0
22112222111121 )[),( dtEcEcNEqpNEqpeEEJ
t
           (24) 
where   is instantaneous annual rate of discount. In this section we will find an optimal harvest 
policy solving the following optimization problem, 
Maximize ),( 21 EEJ  
Subject to (3)-(5)  
and 2,1;)(0
max  iEtE ii  
The Hamiltonian for this control problem is taken as  
H= ][ 221122221111 EcEcNEqpNEqpe
t   
+ 1

[
111311
1
2121
11 )1( NEqNNa
K
NN
Nr 



] 
+ 2
 222322
2
1212
22 )1([ NEqNNa
K
NN
Nr 



] 
+ 3
 ][ 332223111 dNNNaNNa                        (25)  
where 
3,2,1,)(  itii   are adjoint variables. 
We have,  
1E
H


= )(][ 11111111 tNqcNqpe
t                  (26) 
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and  
2E
H


= )(][ 22222222 tNqcNqpe
t                  (27) 
The optimal control 2,1),( itEi  must clearly satisfy the condition 
 0)(0,0)()( max  twhenandtwhenEtE iiii          (28) 
Since 
)(ti  causes )(tEi  to switch between the levels 0 and 
maxE , )(ti (i=1,2) are called 
switching functions. Depending on the switching functions )(ti , the optimal control )(tEi  is a 
bang-bang control switching from one extreme level to other one. Once )(ti (i=1,2) vanishes ,the 
Hamiltonian functions H becomes independent of the control variable )(tEi (i=1,2) and its optimal 
value cannot be determined by the above procedure. It is then called singular control 
max** )(0,)( iii EtEtE  . Hence our optimal harvest policy becomes 









0)(
0)(0
0)(
)(
*
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ii
i
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i
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tE



 
for i=1, 2. For singular control )(ti =0; i=1, 2. Then from (26) and (27) we find that the values of 
1  and 2 are 
)(
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1
11
Nq
c
pe t  
                         (29) 
)(
22
2
22
Nq
c
pe t  
                        (30) 
Now the adjoint equations are 

dt
d 1
1N
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

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2
N
H
dt
d


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
, 3
3
N
H
dt
d




            (31) 
Then using (25) and the third equation of (31) we find  
)]([ 2221113222111
3 dNaNaNaNa
dt
d
 

 
Using (29), (30) we write,  

dt
d 3  11
11
1
1 )( Na
Nq
c
pe t 22
22
2
2 )( Na
Nq
c
pe t 
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11
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1 )[( Na
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p
e t


])( 22
22
2
2 Na
Nq
c
p 
              (32) 
We here consider that the constant of integration vanishes so that the shadow prices 
)3,2,1( ie ti

of three species are bounded. Using (29) and (30) in other two equations of (31) we 
find that, 
][)( 31132122
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, 
and, 
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Now using the values of the adjoint variables 321
,, 
 in the above equations we get, 
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From these we get the following expressions of harvesting efforts,  
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   (33) 
Hence solving the steady state equations together with (32) and (33) we get an optimal equilibrium 
solution   321 ,, NNN  and optimal harvesting efforts 1E  and 2E . 
 
6. Numerical Simulation 
Example 1. For numerical analysis we first consider the following set of values of parameters,  
2.0,4.0,3.0,12,05.0,02.0,2.0
,100,5.2,10,04.0,01.0,1.0,100,09.2
21222`21
221111211


dEqa
KrEqaKr


 
Then the equilibrium points are 0P (0,0,0), 1P (0,25,63.75), 2P (0,76,0), 3P (80.86124,0,0), 
4P (66.6666,0,29.6666), 5P (90.2666,94.0533,0), 6P (38.2647,10.6507,91.2527). 
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Figure 1. Solution Curves of the Species 
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Figure 2. Solution Curves When the Prey Species N2 is Absent 
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Figure 3. Solution Curves When the Prey Species N1 is Absent 
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Figure 4. Phase Diagram in Terms of the Values of the Parameters Taken in Example 1 
 
In Figure 1, we see the solution curves which exhibits the stability of the system at 6
P
 and in Figure 2, 
Figure 3 we see that in absence of one prey the other survives in presence of the predator also. Thus, 
this numerical example supports our hypothesis that the facultative mutualism is not disturbed in the 
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presence of the predator. In Figure 4, we see that for the considered values of the parameters the system 
is also globally stable.  
Example 2. We consider the following set of values of parameters for numerical analysis of optimal 
equilibrium. 
04.0,6,5,15,10,2.0,4.0,3.0,05.0
,02.0,2.0,100,5.2,04.0,01.0,1.0,100,09.2
2121212
2`2122111211




ccppdq
aKrqaKr
Then optimal harvesting efforts are, 9632.131 E , 4487.322 E and corresponding optimal 
equilibrium point is )823.48,082.6,529.50(),,( 321  NNN . From the Figure 7 and Figure 8, it 
can be realized that the mutualism between the prey species remains facultative even when optimal 
harvesting efforts are used. 
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Figure 5. Optimal Solution Curves 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/asir             Applied Science and Innovative Research                  Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017 
14 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
100
N
1
-SpeciesN2-Species
N
3
-S
p
e
c
ie
s
 
Figure 6. Phase Diagram Corresponding to the Optimal Harvesting Efforts 
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Figure 7. Solution Curves Showing Survival of N2 Species in Absence of N1 Species 
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Figure 8. Solution Curves Showing Survival of N1 Species in Absence of N2 Species 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented a mutualism model with independent harvesting efforts on mutualist 
prey species in presence of a predator. During equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation we have 
seen that the predator survives even when one species is extinct. The important fact is that the 
mutualism remains facultative in presence of the predator. This is due to the survival of one species in 
absence of other and in presence of the predator. We derive the optimal harvesting policy and 
numerically the optimal equilibrium, optimal harvesting efforts are obtained. Numerical illustrations 
show that, the mutualism remains facultative even when optimal harvesting efforts are used on prey 
species. This paper includes simple linear predation functions and does not include obligate mutualism 
between the prey species. We used Mat Lab for numerical calculations and graphs. 
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